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ever, In re Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. appears to represent a hopeful
departure from the inflexible nature of its predecessors.
Morgan Guaranty may well be the first step toward a final acceptance
of the proposition that the donee owns the appointive property and that
the exercise of the testamentary power should be governed by the law of
the donee's domicile. Since that proposition is subject to modification in
light of the policies of the jurisdictions involved, the New York court's
rationale has presented an improved, common sense method of handling
similar cases in the future. Traditionally, New York has been a leading
jurisdiction in trust cases, and it is to be hoped that Morgan Guaranty
will be followed throughout the American courts.
RICHARD L. HARDEN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: EXCLUSION OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY DECEITFUL
INDUCEMENT
Insurance companies in workmen's compensation cases are sometimes
faced with a difficult proof problem in exposing a suspected malingerer.
Exaggerated or wholly fraudulent claims of disability based, for example,
on "back pains" may succeed if such claims are otherwise credible in light
of the circumstances surrounding the accident. Motion pictures of the
claimant, taken without his knowledge, often provide valuable defensive
evidence by showing activities inconsistent with his "disability."'
In appropriate cases, however, the insurance company or its private
investigators may not be content with passive observation. Instead of
waiting for the claimant to impeach himself through his normal activities,
the investigators trick him into performing specific acts, films of which
would tend directly to refute a particular disability claim.
2
This tactic has come under review in Redner v. Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Board,3 a recent California Supreme Court decision. It
was held that if a claimant was tricked into engaging in activities which
he otherwise would not have undertaken, motion pictures thereof may not
'See, e.g., Lambert v. Wolfs Inc., 132 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1961). Motion pictures
can of course be effective in other actions where disability is in issue. See, e.g., Mirabile v.
New York Cent. R.R., 230 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956) (FELA action); Witt v. Merrill, 210
F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1954) (action for personal injury damages).
21n the language of the trade, the claimant is thereby set up for a "rope job." Chernoff,
The Demise of the Sub Rosa Investigation, 45 J. ST. B. CAL. 853 (1970).
35 Cal. 3d 83, 485 P.2d 799, 95 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1971).
CASE COMMENTS
be used as evidence to defeat a disability claim in a workmen's compensa-
tion proceeding. The precise holding on the facts went against what little
precedent exists,4 breaking new ground in this narrow area. Of greater
importance is that the reasoning upon which the holding was bottomed
invites inquiry into the broader question of the court's role in regulating
the methods by which civil litigants may procure evidence.5
The facts6 giving rise to the ruling in Redner were essentially undis-
puted, except for the extent of the disability. The claimant, a truck driver
and delivery man, suffered a back injury in April, 1967, while lifting heavy
cartons. The insurance company paid out temporary disability compensa-
tion for fifteen months, during which time the claimant was twice hospi-
talized, operated on once, and given periodic medical examinations and
treatment. From September, 1968, to shortly before the referee's initial
hearing in. October, 1969, he was employed sporadically in part-time,
light-work jobs, still complaining of back and leg pains. Meanwhile, the
carrier, in July, 1968, had retained a private investigating firm to check
into his claim. One of the investigators befriended Redner and invited him
to his ranch for a weekend, whereupon after many drinks and little food,
Redner went horseback riding at the host's suggestion. A second investi-
gator, hidden, took movies of Redner saddling and riding.
7
'Extensive research has turned up only two reported cases where the objection to the
use of motion pictures showing acts which were deceitfully induced was raised: Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Coker, 118 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1941) and McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 111. App.
458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940). In both cases, the motion pictures were held admissible; neither
was cited in Redner. For a discussion of the use of motion pictures in litigation, see Paradis,
The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 235 (1965).
5This discussion will deal only peripherally with the development of the exclusionary
rules in criminal cases based on the fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures by law enforcement agencies. See note 45 infra. For discussion of the
application of the fourth amendment to noncriminal cases, see Note, Admissibility of Ille-
gally Obtained Evidence in Noncriminal Proceedings, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 38 (1969), and
Note, Constitutional Exclusion of Evidence in Civil Litigation, 55 VA. L. REv. 1484 (1969).
6485 P.2d at 801-02.
7The court went on: "Thereafter, on the next day applicant rode again. Unobserved by
the riding party, Chavez took more motion pictures of applicant's activities." Id. at 802. It
is clear that at least part of the proffered motion picture evidence was gathered the following
day. But the court made no reference to any specific act of inducement by the investigators
which lured Redner into riding the second day. Thus it would appear, at least from the
court's version, that the film of the second day's riding would, by the court's own holding,
not have been "obtained. . . by deceitful inducement of an applicant to engage in activities
which he would not otherwise have undertaken." Id. at 807. Whatever effects the cocktail
party and the host's suggestion had had the day before on his inclination toward horseback
riding, his second foray seems to have been completely voluntary. The court must have felt
that all the footage was tainted by the sham weekend, but the discrepancy points up a
possible difficulty in applying the test of "engage in activities which he would not otherwise
have undertaken." Id.
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The insurance company immediately ceased the compensation pay-
ments; it also showed the film to two doctors, neither of whom had
examined Redner for several months. Both declared that Redner was no
longer disabled. A third doctor, who had not seen the film, examined
Redner in June, 1969, and felt that he was precluded from doing heavy
lifting.
In October, 1969, over a year after the horseback-riding incident, the
referee's hearing was held." The carrier eventually introduced the reports
of the two doctors who hadseen the film, but held the motion picture
evidence back. The referee refused to admit the medical reports, appar-
ently because they were based on the doctors' viewing of the film. He rated
Redner's "permanent 'disability precluding more than light work' as 57
percent." 9
Petitioning the appeals board for reconsideration, the insurance com-
pany offered to present the motion picture as evidence. The appeals board
granted the petition, viewed the film,"0 and, relying squarely on it as
convincing evidence of a lack of permanent disability, determined that
Redner's permanent disability ended in September, 1968, the date of the
first doctor's examination.
The California Supreme Court annulled the appeals board order and
reinstated the original award, first finding procedural error in the appeals
board's arbitrary grant of reconsideration and an abuse of discretion in
allowing the carrier to withhold the motion picture until its petition for
reconsideration. But the court asserted that even if the motion picture had
been properly introduced, the referee and the Board would not have been
allowed to rely on it because the carrier had obtained it by "fraudulent
inducement."" Finally, the court found that the appeals board's decision
lacked the support of substantial evidence, with or without the motion
picture and the resultant medical reports."
For a comprehensive discussion of referee hearings, see Bancroft, Some Procedural
Aspects of the California Workmen's Compensation Law, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 378, 386-90
(1952).
1485 P.2d at 803.
l The California Supreme Court also found error in the failure of the appeals board to
allow Redner to cross-examine the cameraman-witness or present rebuttal evidence. Id. at
806.
"Id.
'2The court reasoned that even with the motion picture, there was no substantial evid-
ence to support a finding of no permanent disability since (1) the carrier's attorney conceded
that the film did not show that Redner could do anything more than light work; (2) the film
did not contradict the third doctor's finding that Redner could not perform heavy work;
and (3) Redner's riding (at least the first time) took place while he was under the influence
of alcoholic beverages, which might have reduced his pain. Id. at 809.
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The focus of this discussion, as indicated, is upon the court's direction
to the appeals board:
We therefore conclude that the board may not rely upon evidence
obtained, as in the present case, by deceitful inducement of an
applicant to engage in activities which he would not otherwise have
undertaken. '3
The above language suggests a few initial considerations. First, since
the court, by its own admission, could have disposed of the case on either
the procedural error' 4 or the lack of substantive evidence ground,' 5 the
holding might be best viewed as a warning to workmen's compensation
insurance carriers. As a deterrent to this method of procuring evidence,
the appeals board is now simply precluded from relying on evidence so
obtained. Second, the use of the word "rely" notwithstanding, the court
appeared to be saying something more than that evidence obtained by
deceitful inducement is somehow inherently "unreliable," i.e. inaccurate,
undependable.' 6 Acts recorded on film,' 7 or even witnessed, do not become
less reliable indicia of a claimant's physical capability simply because he
does not know he is being scrutinized or because he is doing something
he normally would not do absent the inducement. That a claimant's ac-
tions, as reproduced on film, do not show convincingly that he is disabled
as claimed, goes, as in Redner, simply to the weight of such evidence, not
to its reliability. Hence, it is submitted that Redner laid down an exclu-
sionary rule: if the claimant can establish that he was duped into perform-
ing acts which he otherwise would not have done, movies or even eye-
witness testimony of such activity will simply not be admitted, regardless
of its materiality, probative value, or substance.
Third, the court established new law with respect to California work-
men's compensation proceedings. No prior holding of exclusion based on
a claim of fraudulent inducement was cited in support of Redner;
extensive research has failed to disclose such a holding, in California' s or
any other jurisdiction.
'M1d. at 807.
"The court noted that it could annul an appeals board decision only if "it is reasonably
probable that, absent the procedural error, the aggrieved party would have attained a more
favorable result." Id. at 806 n.l 1. The court found that Redner fell under this rule.
"The court declared that the appeals board decision would fall on either of two alterna-
tives: "that the board could rely upon the tainted motion picture and the resultant reports
or that the board could not do so." Id. at 808.
"Reliable evidence is "dependable, with reasonable assurance of its probability, as not
only truthful but also true." Ohio Real Estate Comm. v. Cohen, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 187
N.E.2d 641, 646 (C.P. 1962).
"'The court in Redner of course had assumed that the movie itself was an accurate
reproduction of the incident. See Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. CoLo. L. REv. 235
(1965) for a discussion of the various technical objections that can be made to motion
pictures.
"The court in Redner cited Carson v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 31 Cal. Comp.
Cases 291 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), which involved deceitful inducement quite similar to that
1972]
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Finally, it is apparent that the exclusionary rule, as decisional law,
cannot be applied in any action before a California court. Section 351 of
the California Evidence Code 9 provides that all relevant evidence is ad-
missible, except as otherwise provided by statute.2" "Statute" is defined
as including treaties and constitutional provisions. 2' Since the Evidence
Code applies to all actions before California courts,2 it follows that there
can be no decisional rules excluding evidence except those which result
from interpretations of statutes, treaties, and constitutional provisions
which themselves exclude relevant evidence.2? The Redner exclusionary
rule is not based upon any statute, but is pure decisional law. Thus, no
California court could apply Redner in an action before it if the court
found that the evidence obtained was indeed relevant. 24
That the Redner decision could not be applied in actions instituted
before the state's courts,21 by virtue of the legislative mandate declaring
all relevant evidence to be admissible, puts the court in a position of
having laid down an exclusionary rule which, but for the fact that it
applies only to workmen's compensation proceedings, would be contrary
to that mandate. The question is thus raised: what is it about the nature
and purpose of the workmen's compensation law that justifies this kind
of exclusion?
in Redner. The claimant alleged a 20%-25% permanent disability due to a back injury, but
the referee relied on the carrier's motion picture evidence to reduce her award to 2%
permanent disability. The claimant stated that the carrier's investigators had induced her
into engaging in various physical exercises at a beach, while she had been drinking, and
secretly filmed her activities. Apparently no objection was made to the film's admissibility
at the referee's hearing, nor was any objection raised on the claimant's petition for a writ
of review, which was denied by the California District Court of Appeal. No appeal was taken
to the California Supreme Court. Hence, the carrier's method of procuring the motion
picture evidence was not passed upon.
"Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 299, as amended by Cal. Stats. 1965, chs. 937, 1151, effective
January 1, 1967.
"CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 (West 1966). The Law Revision Commission's comment
states: "Section 351 abolishes all limitations on the admissibility of relevant evidence except
those that are based on a statute, including a constitutional provision." Id., Comment.
"Id. § 230. Whenever the Evidence Code refers to decisional law as well as statutes, it
uses the term "law," which is defined in § 160 as including constitutional, statutory, and
decisional law. Id. § 160. See also MeDonough, The California Evidence Code: A Precis,
18 HAST. L.J. 89, 90-93 n.8 (1966).
"CAL. EVID. CODE § 300 (West 1966).
"The same conclusion is reached in McDonough, The California Evidence Code: A
Precis, 18 HAST. L.J. 89, 91-92 (1966.
1ASee CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 300, 351 (West 1966).
rhe Evidence Code, with certain exceptions which are not relevant to the discussion
(e.g.. privileges apply to all proceedings in which testimony may be compelled), does not
apply to administrative proceedings, which include those before the workmen's compensa-
tion appeals board. Id. § 300, Comment.
CASE COMMENTS
Pointing out that the appeals board is not bound by common law or
statutory rules of evidence, 21 but can proceed informally,2 the Redner
court, quoting from the workmen's compensation statute,2 argued that:
Evidence obtained by fraud and deceit in violation of the rights of
the applicant, however, is not "best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit and
provisions" of the workmen's compensation laws. The high pur-
poses of the compensation law should not be perverted by resort
to evidence perfidiously procured.
29
The court thus justified its new exclusionary rule in light of the
policies which the workmen's compensation laws are designed to pro-
mote. Courts have pointed out many benefits of such legislation: the
burden of economic loss is shifted from the worker to the industry;" both
parties avoid costly, formal, time-consuming litigation;3 the common law
rules governing negligence actions are replaced by more appropriate statu-
tory rules.2
2
Pursuant to these policies, the California constitution provides, inter
alia, that "the administration of such legislation shall accomplish sub-
stantial justice."' ' The courts are admonished by statute that the work-
men's compensation laws shall be liberally construed.3 Workmen's com-
pensation, then, can be viewed as a uniform framework directed generally
at regulating industry and workers for the benefit of society as a whole.
But it is not exactly clear how these utilitarian aims support an exclu-
sionary rule of evidence. Bald statements5 of "high purposes" do not
ZCAL. LAB. CODE § 5708 (West 1971) provides in part:
In the conduct thereof they shall not be bound by the common law or
statutory rules of evidence and procedure, but may make inquiry in the
manner, through oral testimony and records, which is best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit
and provisions of this division.
2French v. Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953).
CAL. LAB. CODE § 5708 (Vest 1971).
21485 P.2d at 807.
3OCalifornia Comp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 128 Cal. App. 2d 797, 276
P.2d 148 (1954). Instead of the individual bearing the burden of lost wages and medical
costs, the employer is seen as being in a much better position to absorb the loss by passing
it on to the consumer. The "cost" of injuries, then, is simply reflected in the price of the
goods produced.
31State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 20 Cal. 2d 264, 125 P.2d 42
(1942).
3See Guse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952). The harsh defense
of assumption of risk was abolished in favor of the more reasonable rule of liability regard-
less of fault. Employers, on the other hand, were insulated from unsympathetic juries and
their heavy damage awards.
3'CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 21.
UCAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (\Vest 1971).
WI7he court added as a final observation that "[t]he legal process cannot be stultified
by crowning such amoral maneuvers with apparent success." 485 P.2d at 809.
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explain why these aims would be "perverted" if the exclusionary rule were
not adopted. Insurance carriers are also entitled to "substantial justice."
Forcing them to pay compensation in the face of what might be convinc-
ing evidence of malingering undermines not only their rights but the same
"high purposes" of workmen's compensation which were sought to be
protected. The public interest is not benefitted if the payment of compen-
sation in such cases results in increased insurance premiums, the cost of
which will ultimately be reflected in higher prices for the consumer. In
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Coker,36 the federal court did not inquire into
the "high purposes" of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, but
simply ruled that the motion pictures were admissible even though the
claimant had been tricked into his activities. It is tentatively submitted
that the Redner court's discussion leads only to speculation and confusion
about the gap between the specific holding and the broad policy state-
ments, since those policies are equally supportive of valid countervailing
considerations not discussed by the court.
3 7
If, as has been maintained, an inquiry into workmen's compensation
law proves inconclusive as to support for the rationale of the Redner
decision, an excursion into case law of other jurisdictions may provide a
more concrete understanding, either directly or by analogy.
In only two reported cases3s has the issue of admissibility of a motion
picture, in which the plaintiff had been unwittingly induced to perform
for the purpose of defeating a disability claim, been raised. In McGoorty
v. Benhart,39 plaintiff attempted to show that the woman pictured with
him at a driving range, in a rowboat, and playing basketball, was hired
by the defendant to solicit these athletic displays and that he would not
3118 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1941).
37Furthermore, one section of the Labor Code, not mentioned by the court, also points
away from exclusionary rules by providing that:
No informality in any proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony
shall invalidate any order, decision, award, or rule made and filed as
specified in this division. No order, decision, award, or rule shall be invali-
dated because of the admission into the record, and use as proof of any
fact in dispute, of any evidence not admissible under the common law or
statutory rules of evidence and procedure.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 5709 (West 1971). This section is aimed at allowing the appeals board
the broadest possible latitude in its evidentiary procedure. It is no doubt of primary benefit
to the employee/claimant, but there is no reason why the section cannot be used to the
advantage of the employer or insurance company. Indeed, it can be argued that if the board
is able to admit evidence which in court would be inadmissible, then, by logical implication,
it may admit evidence which in court would be admissible. And, since the two reported cases
dealing with motion pictures obtained by deceitful inducement both held that they were
admissible under the common law, it would appear that the Redner rule comes close to
contravening the mandate expressed in § 5709. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Coker, 118 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1941); McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940); see note 4
supra.
38Maryland Cas. Co. v. Coker, 118 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1941); McGoorty v. Benhart, 305
Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940).
39305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940).
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normally have engaged in them. The court rejected this contention of error
rather summarily, saying:
We do not think it is material what part this girl took in persuad-
ing the plaintiff to do what the pictures disclose he did do. The
pictures speak for themselves and show that the defendant could
do things that he claimed at the trial he could not do. There is no
merit in this contention. 0
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Coker,41 the defendant introduced films
in the trial court purporting to show the plaintiff rowing a boat during a
fishing trip. Plaintiff objected partly on the ground that his host, un-
beknownst to the plaintiff, was an employee of the insurance company
and had enticed him with "female companions and the usual liquid re-
freshments."4 The trial judge strongly indicated his disapproval43 but
admitted the films; he later instructed the jury to disregard his remarks.
Plaintiff won a judgment on the basis of a permanent disability, and the
insurance company appealed, citing the judge's prejudicial remarks as
grounds for a mistrial. The circuit court affirmed, finding harmless error
and commenting meanwhile on the film:
Moving pictures taken of a plaintiff in a personal injury suit, which
may tend to show he is malingering must usually be taken secretly.
On the other hand, when the defendant induces the plaintiff to put
himself in a position where such pictures may be taken, the situa-
tion is somewhat analogous to entrapment in a criminal case.44
The rulings of admissibility in McGoorty and Coker reflect the well-
112 7 N.E.2d at 296.
41118 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1941).
121d. at 44. Plaintiff also denied that he was the one pictured as rowing the boat.
4zrhe trial judge's comments in response to the objection to the admission of the films
were:
Well, as to policy I don't approve of the methods employed, but I assume
under the general rules of law that the jury is entitled to see the pictures
I recognize the merit of the objection to the effect that it is
violating the sense of fairness, propriety and good morals to take pictures
in the way these pictures were allegedly taken.
Id. at 44.
"d. at 44. Since plaintiff had won in the district court, the objection to the admissibility
of the film was of course not raised in the circuit court. Hence, the circuit court's comments
were merely dicta. For a discussion of entrapment see text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
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established common law rule4s that if otherwise admissible,46 all relevant,
competent, and material evidence is admissible over any objections of
wrongdoing in its procurement. 7
The recent case of Sackler v. Sackler4 a divorce action, illustrates the
vitality of the admissibility rule. Plaintiff husband and his private investi-
gators illegally broke into the wife's home and obtained direct evidence
of adultery. Against the argument that the fourth amendment ban on
unreasonable searches, applied to the states via Mapp v. Ohio, 9 required
the exclusion of the evidence, the court in Sackler reasoned that the fourth
amendment applied only to governmental searches. 5 With any possible
constitutional objection eliminated, the court went on to say that
no reason remains for holding inadmissible the evidence here pres-
ented. The basic rule is that all competent, substantial, credible and
relevant evidence is to be available to the courts. The interests of
justice will not be promoted by the announcement by the courts of
new exclusions, since the process of investigating the truth in courts
of justice is an indispensable function of society and since "judicial
rules of evidence were never meant to be used as an indirect method
of punishment" of trespassers and other lawless intruders
[citations omitted]. Any court is taking extreme measures when it
refuses convincing evidence because of the way it was procured.5'
"The common law rule has been modified in criminal cases by the development of the
exclusionary rule grounded on the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search
and seizure, which began with Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (application
to federal courts) and continued through Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (application
to state courts via due process clause of fourteenth amendment). The rule has been extended
to state forfeiture proceedings which, while nominally civil, are really quasi-criminal in
nature. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). However,
almost all the cases have refused to extend the Mapp rule to exclude evidence illegally seized
by a private party in a civil action. See, e.g., Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d
481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964); Del Presto v. Del Presto, 97 N.J. Super. 446, 235 A.2d 240
(Super. Ct. 1967). The facts in Redner did not raise the issue of illegal search and seizure;
the conduct of the carrier might perhaps best be characterized as unethical or unfair.
"E.g., not hearsay, privileged, or prejudicial.
"See Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40,203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
4815 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
11367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 45 supra.
OThe New York court cited Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), which held
that the government could use evidence obtained solely by a private individual, regardless
of whether it was procured through an illegal search, since the fourth amendment applied
only to sovereign authority. The court in Sackler reasoned that the rule in Burdeau was still
valid. See United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964).
11203 N.E.2d at 483 (emphasis added). Accord, Del Presto v. Del Presto, 97 N.J. Super.
446, 235 A.2d 240 (Super. Ct. 1967); State Forester v. Umpqua River Navigation Co., -
Ore. _, 478 P.2d 631 (1970). Contra, Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221
N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966).
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Sackler points up three important policies underlying the admissibil-
ity rule: (1) the court seeks to establish the truth as it relates to and settles
the issues directly before it; (2) the court is interested primarily in the
issues before it-unnecessary collateral attacks on the evidence will un-
duly complicate and delay the litigation; and (3) civil litigants wronged
by improper or illegal evidence-gathering methods have direct remedies
in tort law,52 whereas the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was seen
as the only effective protection that one criminally accused had against
illegal methods of law enforcement.0
Since the methods used in Redner appear to fall short of an unreasona-
ble search and seizure, the policies supporting admissibility which stood
up in Sackler weigh most heavily against the Redner court's findings of
"deceitful conduct" 54 and "amoral maneuvers.
55
But it may be argued that the reasoning of Sackler is distinguishable
from Redner because the latter involved the element of deceitful induce-
ment in an effort to create evidence that normally would not have existed
but for the manipulation by the insurance company. The court in Redner
seemed to invoke the principle that no man shall take advantage of his
own wrong,5 saying that "the carrier should not profit from its own
deceitful conduct." 5 The court in Coker suggested that in such a case an
analogy might be drawn to criminal entrapment."
If such an analogy could be maintained, the rationale underlying crim-
inal entrapment might lend support to the holding in Redner. The defense
of criminal entrapment must first be predicated on government action.
Purely private inducement to criminal activity has never been sufficient
to constitute a defense.55 The conduct sought to be deterred in Redner was
private, thus weakening the comparison. Moreover, the theory of entrap-
ment is based on the idea that the courts will not find guilt in conduct
52See note 66 infra.
"Courts have held that to refer an accused, regardless of a subsequent conviction on
the basis of the illegally seized evidence, to an action in trespass against a policeman was to
give him no remedy or protection at all. Only an absolute exclusionary rule could deter the
police. See State Forester v. Umpqua River Navigation Co., -Ore. _ 478 P.2d 631
(1970).
m485 P.2d at 807.
0ld. at 809.
"Lightbody v. Russell, 45 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
11485 P.2d at 807.
sl 18 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1941). See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
5 United States v. DeAlesandro, 361 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 842
(1966); United States v. Comi, 336 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 992
(1965); People v. Gregg, 5 Cal. App. 3d 502, 85 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1970).
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which has been manufactured by the police.60 The situation in Redner is
analytically distinguishable: the insurance company was not "prosecut-
ing" or complaining of Redner's conduct-horseback riding-as wrong-
ful, but it wished instead to use that conduct only as evidence bearing on
the central issue of disability.
Since criminal entrapment is bound up with concepts of guilt and
government conduct, a more illuminating analogy might be found in the
doctrine of connivance. 6 A type of civil entrapment, this defense to a
divorce action on grounds of adultery provides a direct contrast to the
divorce case in Sackler. If a husband, as in Fonger v. Fonger," hires an
investigator not only to spy on his wife but to entice her into adultery,
the husband will not be heard to complain of her wrong, since he is the
causal force behind the acts of his agent.13 The rationale is clear: having
caused his wife to commit a wrong, the husband cannot then complain of
her conduct and seek relief upon it. Note that the wife's adulterous act,
in an objective sense, remained adulterous. Yet its culpability was dimin-
ished, even excused, in light of the husband's manipulation; its legal effect
was rendered a nullity because, the court could reason, "but for" the
husband's wrong, there would be no reason to come to court. In Sackler,
too, the husband complained of adultery. But he was not the "cause" of
the wrong; her adulterous act was in no way diminished by his illegal
entry. Were his wrongful conduct taken away, there would still remain the
wife's wrong, with only a problem of proof to give it legal effect. The
wrong in Sackler went simply to the procurement of evidence of the wife's
conduct; the latter remained the central issue in the case.
The central issue in Redner was the physical condition of the claimant.
The insurance company asserted that the claimant was healthy. If it can
be argued in Fonger that the wife would have been faithful but for the
connivance of the husband, it cannot likewise be said that Redner would
have remained disabled but for the deceitful conduct of the insurance
company. The analogy breaks down, for the most that can be said is that
the carrier had "caused" evidence bearing on disability to come inio
existence. If the carrier's deceitful conduct were taken away, the central
issue of disability would nevertheless remain in the case.
Hence, it is not clear precisely how the carrier would "profit from its
6Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). For a discussion of the majority and
concurring opinions as to the theory underlying the defense, see Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1333 (1960).
"The defense is complete when the libellee shows that the libellant has by some affirma-
tive act facilitated the commission of adultery. Hayden v. Hayden, 326 Mass. 587, 96
N.E.2d 136 (1950).
62160 Md. 610, 154 A. 443 (1931).
6Id.
CASE COMMENTS
own deceitful conduct" in the sense of "causing" a wrong to occur to
its own interests and then seeking legal relief based on that wrong. The
court's implication was that the carrier should not profit by withholding
its payments, regardless of its case on the merits as to whether the claim-
ant was injured or healthy. Such a punitive rule, it is submitted, has no
place in the "high purposes" of the workmen's compensation law, nor is
the public served by eventually having to bear the cost of unnecessary and
undeserved compensation payments.
In examining the Redner decision in the context of workmen's com-
pensation law and California statutes, and in juxtaposition with other
important cases, such as Sackler, one salient question has emerged: how
should courts curb the conduct of a litigant which, although unethical and
possibly illegal, nevertheless is only collaterally relevant to the substantive
issue before them? Redner seemed to indicate that the choice was between
allowing the legal process to "be stultified by crowning such amoral
maneuvers with apparent success" 5 and laying down a rule that is both
punitive and absolutely exclusionary as to possibly valuable evidence. The
policies behind the exclusionary rule in Mapp may simply be insufficient
to support such exclusion in private, civil litigation. And if the admissibil-
ity policy behind Sackler can withstand a constitutional attack, then it
would seem that a ruling of admissibility in Redner and a straightforward
decision on the merits would also have stood for the integrity of the fact-
finding process.
To conceptualize the problem in the above polarities was to miss the
objective balance of a middle course: neither approve nor punish conduct
merely collateral to the issue at hand. Instead, if the claimant indeed feels
that his privacy has been intruded upon,16 let him proceed separately on
that cause of action. Only then will the issue of the insurance company's
"fraudulent inducement" and "deceitful conduct" truly be before the
courts. If substantial compensatory and even punitive damages are al-
lowed, an effective and legally sound deterrent will be established.
JOHN MURRAY MASON
8485 P.2d at 807.
"Id. at 809.
"The court alluded to this possibility by indicating that "the referee found that the
carrier fraudulently obtained the film by means of a violation of applicant's rights." Id. at
807. The court suggested that such tactics may give rise to a suit for invasion of privacy on
the theory of an intrusion considered unreasonable to an ordinary man. See Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 383, 390-91 (1960); Alabama Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Partridge,
284 Ala. 442, 225 So. 2d 848 (1969); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255
N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
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